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JOHN M. GRIESBACH* 
A year ago, the Saint Louis University Law Journal published “Teaching 
Contracts”1 as the first in a series of symposium issues addressing the teaching 
of particular law school subjects.  Not unpredictably, the Journal has selected 
“Teaching Torts” to be the second in the series.  As another mainstay of the 
first year, Torts is a subject that every lawyer (and every law teacher) has 
experienced, and so each of us is in a position to compare and assess what 
various instructors mean to do with their courses.  And that covers quite a bit 
of ground, for we who teach Torts, like those who teach Contracts, attempt to 
do many different things.  Some of them come with the territory.  Every torts 
course involves the explication of some version of “the common law method” 
for creating and changing legal rules and doctrines.  Every torts course 
explores critical connections between “substantive” and “procedural” law.  
Every torts course demands that the student bring to bear his or her 
understanding of legal structures to solve actual problems.  But, beyond this 
common ground, torts teachers vary greatly in their objectives, in their 
perspectives and methodologies and in the extent to which they accept or are 
critical of the present state of the law. 
Indeed, the most striking overall impression from reading this issue is one 
of variation and difference in the perspectives, approaches and objectives of 
those who teach Torts.  Some torts courses are taught with close attention to 
technical detail and the lawyering craft; others are pitched at a much more 
abstract level; still others are offered from a critical reformist point of view.  
Some torts teachers stress historical context and doctrinal pedigree; others 
emphasize sociological features of the cases; still others approach their 
materials from economics or from the theory of ethics or from some stance in 
post-Modern thought.  Some torts courses focus on procedural and evidentiary 
issues; others emphasize connections with insurance; still others open many 
important enquiries with questions that arise in the treatment of damages 
materials. 
There is much to be gained from the many approaches and perspectives set 
out in these papers.  Any teacher of Torts will find in them some unexpected 
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ways to enrich the quality of his or her course.  Serious students of Torts will 
be rewarded with deeper and broadened understandings.  But this overall 
impression of pedagogical diversity is somewhat misleading, for it needs to be 
considered in light of the great many doctrines, rules and issues common to all 
torts courses.  Every teacher of Torts has a plan or strategy for taking up these 
common elements.  In the opening article, professor Joseph Little from the 
University of Florida describes how he organizes these common tort law topics 
around the stages of the lawsuit.2  Professor Jerry Phillips of the University of 
Tennessee explains how, influenced by Grant Gilmore and American Legal 
Realism, he uses the cases and problems of tort law to illustrate the complex, 
tentative and indeterminate character of doctrinal analysis.3  In my own case, I 
treat the basic rules, doctrines and issues of tort law as components of a distinct 
kind of regulatory system.  Stripped to its basics, that system is taken to be a 
structure for generating a great many object lessons as to how to avoid 
otherwise occurring injuries.  And it is as relative to that structure that I find 
the contributions to this symposium issue to be especially useful. 
On my course organization, the heart of the torts regulatory system is what 
I call “the lesson drawing part” of tort law.  It consists of those doctrines, rules 
and legal moves by virtue of which judges and juries examine past injurious 
scenarios with an eye towards specifying what people should do (and what 
people should avoid doing) so as to reduce the incidence of injuries.  Lessons 
are drawn at three levels of human action.  At the least detailed level—which is 
circumscribed with strict liability causes of action—lessons are drawn as to 
eliminating, transforming or modifying the natures of activities in ways that 
are reckoned to reduce injurious outcomes.  At a more detailed level of human 
action—which is addressed with negligence cases—lessons are drawn with 
respect to taking worthwhile preventive measures in the course of carrying out 
presumptively benign activities.  And finally, at the most discriminating 
level—which is the domain of intentional tort causes of action and associated 
privileges—lessons are drawn as to abstaining from intentionally acting in 
ways that are deemed to be almost invariably harmful. 
Befitting the centrality of this lesson drawing part of tort law, more than 
half of the contributions to this issue address the teaching of such matters.  And 
each takes a perspective that brings out the richness or suggests a pedagogical 
approach that speaks to the complexity of tort law in action.  Professor Patrick 
Kelley of Southern Illinois University-Carbondale offers a fascinating look at 
the intellectual and historical contexts within which Learned Hand formulated 
his famous cost-benefit elaboration of negligence in the Carroll Towing Co. 
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case.4  Professor William Nelson of New York University, taking up the Hand 
test in its universalized Chicago School interpretation, shows how he uses 
ordinary hypotheticals to bring out moral objections to the extension of cost-
benefit criteria to the assessment of intentional conduct.5  Professor Margo 
Schlanger of Harvard also writes about the teaching of negligence, but her 
focus is on confronting her students with what I call “the categorization 
problem,” as she has her class consider how taking gender differences into 
account tends to skew conduct assessments generated by the Hand test.6  Judge 
Robert Keeton, writing from the perspective of a third career in the law, 
illustrates how jury instruction drafting exercises can be used to engage 
students in a rigorous analysis of how to deal with partly unsettled issues of 
“intent” in complex, statute-based liability cases.7  And Professor Joan Vogel 
of Vermont Law School, writing from the standpoint of legal anthropology, 
illustrates through a study of the background of the 1908 Vermont case, Ploof  
v. Putnam, how attention to realities of class and ethnicity is often necessary to 
a solid understanding of the conduct of the principals in the cases.8 
But lessons as to how to prevent injuries are not likely to in fact prevent 
them unless they are brought home to prospective injurers.  And that is the 
function of what I call “the object lesson-making part” of the tort system.  Tort 
law transforms lessons drawn from past injurious scenarios into object lessons 
by using those cases to apprise prospective injurers of connections between 
particular kinds of tortious conduct and particular kinds of injuries and by 
creating incentives for prospective injurers to avoid the indicated sorts of 
injurious conduct.  The connections between the kinds of tortious conduct and 
the kinds of injuries avoided are traced primarily by satisfying cause-in-fact 
requirements.  The incentives are created largely in consequence of tort law’s 
damage remedy.  These functions, of course, are greatly complicated when the 
conduct of multiple injurers and of the injured parties themselves are  involved, 
and so doctrines of comparative fault, contribution and indemnity, and rules 
respecting settlements, set-offs and liens are implicated.  And though of more 
theoretical and pedagogical than practical import, it is in this object lesson-
drawing part of the torts system that “no legal cause” doctrines (including the 
oft-confusing “unforeseeable kind of injury” locution) have their true home as 
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devices for excepting cases of psychological mismatch and of deterrent 
overkill from an otherwise imposition of liability. 
Several contributors already mentioned touch upon issues that surface in 
this object lesson-drawing part of tort law.  Judge Keeton’s discussion of the 
jury instruction drafting exercise considers alternative ways of focusing the 
cause-in-fact enquiry.9  Professor Nelson refers to a proximate cause line of 
cases in his questioning of the limits of cost-benefit assessments of conduct.10  
But here we have more than side-glances at the teaching of this part of tort law.  
Three contributors to this issue extensively address the teaching of matters 
involved in object lesson-making.  Professor Ellen Pryor of Southern 
Methodist University surveys many of the issues, controversies and 
developments that the teacher might address in dealing with compensable 
damages in non-death cases, and she offers a strategy for the teacher pressed 
by time and coverage demands.11  Professor David Robertson of the University 
of Texas shows us how the law teacher can take a reformist stance, as he 
criticizes the prevailing percentage-based approach to apportioning 
comparative fault for, among other things, fostering a confusion with cause-in-
fact and legal cause issues, and he proposes the adoption of a much simplified 
“fault line method” for apportioning fault.12  And Professors Fischer and Jerry 
of the University of Missouri describe how study of insurance law concepts 
and issues can be used to examine tort law objectives and how it enhances 
students’ understandings of many matters involved in this object lesson-
making part of tort law.13 
Now on my organizational scheme, there is a third part to the tort system—
which I call “the scope of tort part”—that includes various rules and doctrines 
by which judges (in the main) determine the reach of tort law’s object-lesson 
style regulation.  This delimiting function is performed partly by use of general 
rules disabling injured persons from proceeding in tort in “nonfeasance” cases, 
in cases of “pure psychic loss,” and in cases of “pure economic loss,” along 
with the many exceptions to those rules.  But the same function, with a reversal 
in the burden of persuasion, is performed with the various immunity rules and 
with several types of “assumption of risk.”  Though juries are commonly 
charged with applying such rules, the basic decisions have judges 
comparatively assessing the propriety in various contexts of tort law’s object-
lesson style regulation relative to other ways of controlling, influencing or 
regulating the incidence of injuries. 
 
 9. See Keeton, supra note 7. 
 10. See Nelson, supra note 5. 
 11. Ellen S. Pryor, The Challenge of Teaching Damages, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817 (2001). 
 12. David W. Robertson, Eschewing Ersatz Percentages: A Simplified Vocabulary of 
Comparative Fault, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 831 (2001). 
 13. David A. Fisher & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best 
Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857 (2001). 
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Not surprisingly, perhaps, there are no contributions to this issue that 
extensively address the teaching of the proper limits of tort law.  Professor 
Pryor touches on the topic in her discussion of the teaching of parental and 
child consortium cases.14  Questions of the proper reach of tort lie in the 
immediate background in much of Professor Fischer and Jerry’s discussion of 
connections between insurance and teaching Torts.15  But it seems to me that 
the failure to address these matters here in this “Teaching Torts” symposium 
says something important about teaching Torts.  Partly, it reveals some of the 
losses that have been suffered as credit hours for the basic torts course have 
been reduced from six to five to four or fewer over the past decades.  However, 
it also reveals some of the practical consequences of theoretical change, as 
both scholars and judges have confused doctrinal devices for limiting the reach 
of tort with issues properly belonging to the lesson drawing and object lesson 
making parts of tort law.  But as evidenced by recent tort-like litigation by 
states and cities seeking damages for wholly economic losses attributed to the 
actions of tobacco, lead paint and firearm manufacturers, questions as to the 
proper scope of tort law do not disappear.  The importance of these issues 
argues for an advanced “Proper Limits of Tort” course and perhaps for a future 
symposium issue dealing with the teaching of it. 
 
 14. See Pryor, supra note 11, at 821-22. 
 15. See Fischer & Jerry, supra note 13. 
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